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Multitasking is endemic in modern life and work:  drivers talk on cell phones, 
office workers type while answering phone calls, students do homework while text 
messaging…but, nurses also prepare injections while responding to doctor’s calls, 
and air traffic controllers direct aircraft in one sector while handling aircraft 
additional traffic in another.  Whether in daily life or at work, we are constantly 
bombarded with multiple, concurrent interruptions and demands and we have all 
somehow come to believe in the myth that we can, and in fact are expected to, 
easily address them all—without any repercussions.  Accumulating However, 
accumulating scientific evidence is now suggesting that multitasking increases the 
probability of human error. This talk presents a set of NASA studies that 
characterize concurrent demands in one work domain, routine airline cockpit 
operations, in order to illustrate the ways operational task demands together with 
the natural proclivity to manage them all concurrently make human performance in 
this and in any work domain vulnerable to potentially serious errors and to 
accidents. 
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A	deadly	omission	(among	other	things)	
•  20	August	2008:	MD-82	on	takeoﬀ	from	Madrid	
–  Flaps	not	set	for	takeoﬀ	
	
A	deadly	omission	(among	other	things)	
•  20	August	2008:	MD-82	on	takeoﬀ	from	Madrid	
–  Flaps	not	set	for	takeoﬀ	
•  NASA	ASRS:	since	2000,	pilots	have	reported		their	failure	
to	properly	set	the	ﬂaps	for	takeoﬀ	over	60	.mes!	
Hanging	by	a	thread…	
•  ASRS	#658970,	night	of	May	2005,	DCA	
•  DCA,	VMC		
•  Crew	of	B737-800	repor.ng:	
•  “..	As	we	started	the	taxi,	I	called	for	the	taxi	checklist,	but	
became	confused	about	the	route	and	queried	the	ﬁrst	
oﬃcer	to	help	me	clear	up	the	discrepancy.	We	discussed	
the	route	and	con.nued	the	taxi...			We	were	cleared	for	
takeoﬀ	from	runway	1,	but	the	ﬂight	afendant	call	chime	
wasn't	working.	I	had	called	for	the	Before	Takeoﬀ	
checklist,	but	this	was	interrupted	by	the	communica.ons	
glitch.	..	On	takeoﬀ,	rota.on	and	lihoﬀ	were	sluggish.	At					
100-150	h	as	I	con.nued	to	rotate,	we	got	the	s.ck	
shaker.	The	ﬁrst	oﬃcer	no.ced	the	no	ﬂap	condi*on	and	
placed	the	ﬂaps	to	5.	(No	takeoﬀ	warning	horn.		
Discovered	popped	circuit	breaker	back	at	the	gate)…”	
Inadvertent	(deadly)	
Procedural		Omissions	
Dismukes	(2006)	looked	at	27	major	avia.on	
accidents	in	U.S.	(1987-2001)	in	which	crew	
error	was	cited	as	causal	or	contribu.ng	factor	
	
Typical	examples	include	
•  Detroit	(1987):	DC-9	crashed	shortly	a@er	take-oﬀ		
–  NTSB:		Flaps/slats	not	set	to	take-oﬀ	posi.on	
•  Dallas	(1988):	B-727	crashed	shortly	a@er	take-oﬀ	
–  NTSB:	Flaps/slats	not	set	to	take-oﬀ	posi.on	
•  LaGuardia	(1994):		MD-82	ran	oﬀ	runway	end	a@er	a	high-speed	rejected	take-oﬀ	
–  NTSB:	pitot	heat	not	turned	on	-	anomalous	airspeed	indica.ons		
•  Houston	(1996):		DC-9	landed	gear-up	
–  NTSB:		Hydraulic	pump	not	set	to	high	posi.on	
•  LiNle	Rock	(1999):	MD-80	ran	oﬀ	runway	end	a@er	landing	
–  NTSB:	ground	spoilers	and	autobrakes	not	armed	before	landing	
Were	these	accidents	unique?	
•  No,	they	are	just	the	.p	of	the	iceberg	
	
	
ASRS	reports	tell	us	about:	
•  Rejected	take-oﬀ	–	forgot	ﬂaps	
•  Runway	incursion	–	forgot	to	monitor	
•  Broken	tow-bar	–	forgot	to	clear	pushback	crew	
•  Taxiing	into	a	ditch	–	forgot		to	brief	
•  Engine	ﬂame-out	–	forgot	to	stop	fuel	transfer	
•  Depar.ng	with	inadequate	fuel	–	forgot	to	check	on	preﬂight	
•  Leaving	APU	running	during	takeoﬀ	–	forgot	checklist	item	
•  Took	oﬀ	without	PDC	–	forgot	to	request	
•  Deviated	from	speed	or	al.tude	restric.on	–	forgot	to	enter	on	MCP	
•  Flying	wrong	departure	route	–	forgot	to	follow	new	instruc.ons	
=>	Compromises	to	safety	
=>	Unnecessary	costs	and	delays	
Are	pilots	alone?	
Is	Avia.on	alone?	
No.	
	
We	see	the	same	problems	
in	all	high-risk	
industries.	
	

Data	Sources	
Personal	ﬂying	experience	
Many	diﬀerent	jumpseat	observa.ons	
•  Airline	Training	
•  Analysis	of	FOMs,	SOPs,	&	Checklists	
•  Analysis	of	accident	and	incident	reports	
	
•  Extensive	interac.on	with	par.cipa.ng	
carriers	and	others.	
Data	Sources	
Structured	Jumpseat	Observa.ons	and	crew	
interviews	
	
•  Two	major	US	carriers	
•  Rou.ne,	revenue	ﬂights,	B737	
•  1-2	hour	legs;	3-day	trips	
•  All	phases	of	ﬂight	
•  All	over	the	country	(domes.c	ops)	
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Pilot calls when ready Pilot is ready 
Ac.vi.es	are:	
•  Linear:	task	B	always	follows	task	A,	in	a	ﬁxed
	sequence	
•  Controllable:		tasks	ini.ated	by	each	pilot,	
	independently,	at	their	choice	
•  Predictable:	informa.on	available	when	
	needed,	communica.ons	possible		when	
necessary	
In	THEORY…	
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Restart it before takeoff
Repeat checklist Acknowledge instructions
Form new mental pictureDefer  checklist
Remember to ask 
again when FO available 
Set flaps before takeoff
Verify with FO
Rush/repeat checklist
+ MONITOR  
airport traffic + MONITOR
taxi progress 
per instructions
+ MONITOR
Tower frequency
+ Switch to Tower frequency 
Resume checklist
InterruptionBrief new  runwayConsult charts
Accept new runway?
Change in takeoff runway
+ Confirm CA’s understanding 
TAKEOFF + Take control of aircraft while finishing checklist 
+ Shoulder harnesses 
+ “Clear” runway 
+ Identify/remember turns 
+ Follow hold-short instructions 
+ Identify/Remember aircraft to follow 
Taxi.. in reality
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Taxi.. in reality 
≠ 
	 	Theory	 		is	diﬀerent	from						 	 		Prac*ce	
OK,	so	What?	
•  Pilots	(and	others)	become	accustomed	to	
concurrent	task	demands,	interrup.ons,	
distrac.ons	and	disrup.ons.	
and	the	truth	is	…	
•  Pilots	(and	others)	rou.nely	manage	
mul.ple,	compe.ng,	concurrent	task	
demands	just	ﬁne…		
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CAPTAIN                                                                                  FIRST OFFICER 
Failed to start engine #-2 - distracted while discussing special operations for destination; omitted checklists - delay takeoff 
Confuse own position on taxiway diagram - new terminal; studying NOTAMs; runway change – 
taxied into ditch 
Neglected to set flaps - preoccupied with new departure clearance and packs-off operation - aborted takeoff 
Incorrect trim setting - checklist interrupted after item had been read but not verified – aborted takeoff 
Started taxi without clearance – rushed by other aircraft waiting 
to pull into gate; radio congestion; marshaller’s headset 
inoperative – query by Ground controller 
Omitted call for flaps - rushed to clear ramp/gate area for arriving aircraft - aborted takeoff 
Omitted checklist - busy with delayed engine start and 
checklists;  rushed to accept takeoff clearance - flaps 
not set, aborted takeoff 
Omitted checking into bleed air indicator light-busy with delayed engine start 
and checklists –  
crew rushed to perform delayed engine start – flew with potential equipment 
problem 
Omitted flaps - crew discussing problem with APU, delayed flaps due to snow - aborted takeoff 
Flaps incorrectly set, missed noticing during checklist - 
crew busy with fuel problem, runway changes, programming 
FMC - aborted takeoff 
Omit checklist - running late, 
checklist interrupted by Tower, 
unexpected clearance for 
takeoff - aborted takeoff 
FO failed to monitor CA - busy checking and 
correcting calculations of load data - aircraft 
taxied past hold short line 
Fail to confirm flap position - evaluating heavy rain showers; rushed to accept takeoff 
clearance - aborted takeoff 
FO failed to monitor CA – busy with 
flow; night taxi – taxied in wrong 
direction 
CA taxis without having fully understood instructions - busy 
looking at other aircraft on taxiway and ramp – warning issued 
by Ground controller 
FO failed to monitor CA - busy with pre-takeoff preparations - aircraft crossed 
hold short line 
FO failed to monitor CA - busy reprogramming FMC for runway change - taxied past 
intended taxiway 
Flaps incorrectly set - late paperwork and runway change; 
programming FMC;short taxi; rushed to accept takeoff 
clearance - aborted takeoff 
Started taxi without clearance - trouble-shooting problem with engine start - nearly 
hit ground handler 
Started taxi without clearance - crew discussing taxi instructions - struck pushback tug 
Omitted flaps-checklist 
interrupted by Tower; crew 
rushed to accept takeoff 
clearance-aborted takeoff 
Omitted flaps - checklist interrupted by thrust 
reverser light; crew busy troubleshooting - 
aborted takeoff 
Misunderstood Tower instruction - new FO on IOE, CA coaching FO - taxied onto runway 
without clearance 
Taxi  Errors 
The	reality	of	cockpit	opera.ons	
Constant	presence	of	Perturba*ons	that:	
•  Interrupt	ongoing	ac*vity	
•  Force	tasks	to	be	performed	outside	their	normal	
	(habitual)	sequence	
•  Give	rise	to	new,	unan*cipated	tasks	
	
Implica.ons:	
•  ANen*on	diverted,	even	if	for	split	second	
•  Ac*ons	and	tasks	suspended	
•  Ac*ons	and	tasks	deferred	
•  Ac*ons	and	tasks	interleaved	
•  Deferred	tasks	must	be	remembered	later	
•  …There	is	no	PAUSE	buNon!	
A	word	about	prospec.ve	memory…	
Vulnerable	to	Omissions	when…	
(4	Prototypical	Situa0ons)	•  Interrupted	
–  e.g.,	interrupted	while	conduc.ng	a	checklist	–															 	
	forget	to	return	to	line	item	at	which	interrupted	
•  Must	perform	tasks	outside	normal	(habitual)	
	sequence	
–  e.g.,	defer	seung	ﬂaps	un.l	reaching	runway	for		 	
	takeoﬀ	because	of	slush	on	taxiway	–	forget	to	 	 	
	extend	ﬂaps	before	takeoﬀ	
•  Must	perform	new,	unan*cipated	tasks	(in	lieu	of	
habitual	ac.ons)		
–  e.g.,	ﬂy	diﬀerent	heading	than	normal	upon	departure	–								
	 	forget	to	comply	with	new	instruc.on	and	ﬂy	 	 	
	usual	heading	instead	
•  Must	interleave	mul*ple	tasks	
–  e.g.,	re-program	FMC	during	taxi	–	forget	to	monitor	 	
	aircrah	
The	hidden	complexity	of	cockpit	opera.ons	
•  Complexity	is	not	just	a	mafer	of	workload	
•  Situa.ons	appear	diverse	but	share	underlying	
features	that	involve:	
Mul*tasking:	mul.ple	tasks,	concurrently	
	
•  Pilots	(all	humans)	cannot	mul*task	well	
	 	yet	they	typically	do	it:	
• without	a	second	thought	
• without	an	apprecia.on	of	their	true	(in)ability	
• with	an	incomplete	understanding	of	the	risks	they	
are	taking	when	doing	so	
The	Mul.tasking	Myth	
•  We	typically	overes.mate	our	ability	to	mul*task	
•  In	reality,	our	ability	to	mul.task	is	a	func.on	of:	
–  the	degree	to	which	tasks	are	prac.ced	together	
–  the	degree	to	which	each	individual	task	requires	
	conscious	eﬀort	and	afen.on	
–  the	cues	available	to	prompt	recall	of	intended	ac.ons		
•  Mul.tasking	situa.ons	substan.ally	increase	our	
	vulnerability	to	errors	
–  Common	error:	forgeung/failing	to	perform	a 	
	procedural	step	
–  Common	error:	inafen.on	(being	distracted)	
And	the	truth	about	mul.tasking…	
JKK	5022	Madrid	
Omission:	ﬂaps	for	takeoﬀ	
Crew	experienced	perturba*ons:	
•  An	interrup.on	(break	in	predictability)	
•  The	need	to	re-arrange/repeat	tasks																																	
	 	 	(break	in	linearity)	
•  The	need	to	make	up	for	lost	.me																																		
	 	 	(break	in	controllability)	
•  “Fast-forwarded”	based	on	an	expecta.on,	and		 	
	environmental	cues	(did	not	hit	“Pause”	bufon)	
Additional Information: 
THANK YOU for your attention 
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